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Abstract
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) is a powerful economic tool that gives posi-
tive conditional incentives for the provision of additional ecosystem services over
the status quo, which has been used widely in terrestrial conservation. Interest in
the concept of marine PES has recently emerged, but the fluid, transboundary and
often common pool nature of marine ecosystems presents challenges for PES design
and implementation. Here, we consider the potential role of PES in addressing cur-
rent gaps in fisheries management. Used in combination with conventional regula-
tory approaches, PES may increase private sector engagement and generate more
sustainable financing for fisheries management whilst spreading accountability
throughout the supply chain. The approach is most likely to be feasible and effec-
tive in commercially valuable fisheries with: (i) demand for one or more ecosystem
service and a threat to supply; (ii) suitable baseline data available and potential
management actions underpinned by robust science; (iii) clarity and security of
property rights; (iv) capacity for hybrid multi-level governance; (v) capacity for
rigorous monitoring, control and surveillance; and (vi) potential for financial sus-
tainability of the scheme. An examination of four contrasting fisheries – Namibian
hake, Mozambican shallow-water shrimp, Western and Central Pacific skipjack
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tuna and Bangladesh hilsa – demonstrates that a developing world fishery will
rarely fulfil each of these preconditions a priori, but that the potential for successful
application of PES still exists. In practice, PES design will depend on the institu-
tional context and require creative and innovative approaches to the maintenance
of conditionality and additionality.
Keywords Additionality, conditionality, financial sustainability, positive incentives,
shrimp, tuna
Introduction
Marine fisheries are of significant value to the glo-
bal economy, both in extractive terms – through
industry, employment and food security – and in
terms of their delivery of other ecosystem services
(ES) such as nutrient cycling and biological regu-
lation (World Bank 2010; TEEB 2012). Neverthe-
less, inadequate fisheries policy and management
have led to an international decline in marine fish
stocks and ecosystem health, and economic under-
performance (Ye et al. 2012). Subsequently, there
has been a shift away from traditional single-spe-
cies fisheries management towards an ecosystem-
based approach and the concurrent development
of and government commitments to a plethora of
new management tools such as marine protected
areas (MPAs) and catch shares (Pikitch et al.
2004; FAO 2008; Vietch et al. 2012).
However, despite individual sustainable fisheries
management achievements (Hilborn 2007),
current efforts are still not operating at the scale
necessary to rebuild fisheries globally (Beddington
et al. 2007; Mora et al. 2009; Ye et al. 2012).
Effective implementation of management tools is
limited by a lack of adequate financing and appro-
priate institutional support, particularly in the
developing world where fisheries often lack data,
political will and capacity for monitoring, control
and surveillance (MCS) (Grafton et al. 2008). The
major challenge now remaining is how to create
the enabling conditions for sustainable investment
in innovative approaches to fisheries management
(Rangeley and Davies 2012).
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) is a tool
widely used in terrestrial conservation to change
incentives for environmental decisions, particularly
in middle-income developing countries (Engel et al.
2008; Muradian et al. 2010). Although there has
been little empirical analysis of PES implementation
and efficacy (Farley and Costanza 2010), evidence
suggests that PES can effectively complement con-
ventional regulatory approaches to conservation
(Wunder et al. 2008). While any conservation
intervention is less likely to succeed in weak insti-
tutional settings, PES may facilitate the strengthen-
ing of institutions and ease cooperation in cases
where governance is poor (Kosoy et al. 2007;
Clements et al. 2010; Wunder 2013). Furthermore,
the approach can be sustainable in the long term,
especially when integrated with other interventions
such as community management (Clements et al.
2010; Fisher 2012) and when developed in parallel
with creative financing mechanisms such as trust
funds (Goldman-Benner et al. 2012).
The concept of marine PES is still nascent,
largely due to the fluid, transboundary and often
common pool nature of marine ecosystems. Dis-
cussion has been directed towards the develop-
ment of payments for the protection of coastal
ecosystems such as mangroves, particularly for
their role in carbon sequestration, where lessons
can be drawn more easily from terrestrial experi-
ence (Lau 2012; Locatelli et al. 2014). However,
interest in the application of PES in fisheries has
emerged in recent years (Lau 2012; Binet et al.
2013; Mohammed 2013; Micheli et al. 2014).
Attention has in particular focused on developing
world fishing and coastal communities, but critical
discussion and empirical analysis are limited (Barr
and Mourato 2009; Begossi et al. 2011a; Barr
2012; Hallwass et al. 2013; Begossi 2014). In this
study, we explore the potential for a PES approach
to help address current challenges and gaps in
fisheries management in the developing world.
Although they may present the greatest tests for
PES in terms of weak governance, ill-defined prop-
erty rights and lack of technical resources and
capacity, developing countries also present some of
the greatest opportunities for additional gains,
particularly through possible contributions to food
security and poverty alleviation.
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We first outline the principles that, in theory,
distinguish PES from other fisheries management
tools and explore the ways in which PES may be
applied in fisheries. We then discuss the institu-
tional and environmental preconditions that would
help to ensure successful delivery of a fisheries PES
scheme in practice, before illustrating some real-
world opportunities for and limitations to the
approach using four contrasting case-studies.
The deﬁning principles of PES in a ﬁsheries
context
PES is most commonly defined as a voluntary
transaction whereby a well-defined ES (or actions
likely to secure it) is ‘bought’ from at least one ES
provider by at least one buyer, if and only if the
payment is conditional on provision of that ES
(Wunder 2005). In other words, it translates exter-
nal values into positive incentives for behavioural
changes, which are expected to increase the provi-
sion of one or more ES. These positive incentives,
which might be financial or in-kind, are paid to
the ES provider (the individual or group account-
able for ES delivery) for carrying out a specific
management activity. Although Wunder’s defini-
tion is the clearest and most detailed, in practice
PES schemes rarely fulfil each of his five criteria
(Muradian et al. 2010). Recent conceptualizations
focus on the core principles of positive incentives
and conditionality and emphasize the consideration
of additionality – the degree to which a PES
scheme adds value over what would have hap-
pened in its absence (Sommerville et al. 2009; Tac-
coni 2012). Here, we outline the principles that
theoretically set PES apart from other fisheries
management tools and the extent to which they
may be addressed in a fisheries context (Fig. 1).
Clearly defined ES
Theory states that the service(s) in question should
be clearly defined in order for provision to be quan-
tifiable (Wunder 2005; Tacconi 2012), but the
interconnectivity of marine ES makes them difficult
to define in time and space. For example, if pay-
ments were made to fishers for avoiding a specific
area of habitat with the aim of increasing fish pro-
vision, this service might be difficult to disentangle
from other ES that may also be delivered through
this action (such as improved benthic habitat).
‘Bundled’ PES schemes could be used to address
these challenges, whereby payment is received for
multiple ES grouped together in a single package of
conservation outcomes (e.g. habitat conservation
or fishery performance), which, in turn, may raise
the incentive for management activities with multi-
ple potential outcomes and may reduce trade-offs
between ES (Lau 2012). Lau (2012) also considers
the benefits of ‘stacking’, whereby separate pay-
ments are generated for distinct ES, but this kind of
payment structure is less able to reflect the com-
plexity and interconnected nature of ecosystems.
Successful implementation of bundling in terrestrial
conservation has been rare (Engel et al. 2008); it
can be more costly and difficult than dealing with
single ES due to an increase in stakeholder groups
involved (Lau 2012). However, efforts are under-
way to address these challenges (Wendland et al.
2010; LaRocco and Deal 2011), and lessons from
work on markets for the bundling of agricultural
products with other ES in Africa and Latin America
may be applicable to the bundling of seafood with
other ES (Andersson et al. 2010).
Buyers and providers
The potential providers in a fisheries PES
scheme range from individuals or communities of
small-scale fishers to industrial fishing fleets to
nation states. If a provider is to receive payment
Figure 1 Schematic for a fisheries PES. Buyers may
include seafood supply chain actors, governments and
NGOs and may form public–private partnerships; the
maximum payment is represented by the value of the ES
in question to the buyer and the minimum by the
opportunity costs incurred by the provider for carrying
out the management activity, which leads to ES
provision; desired outcomes might include fishery
recovery and therefore enhanced profitability or provision
of other ES of concern to the buyer; payment should be
conditional on provider behaviour or ES outcomes.
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and thereby be held accountable for ES delivery,
or at least for management actions, they must
have some level of ownership or control over ES
delivery (Wunder 2013). However, property rights
are often unclear in fisheries, particularly in the
developing world where they may be traditional
or undocumented, making identification of provid-
ers potentially difficult (Muradian 2013). Even
when rights are defined and enforced, the high
mobility of marine resources makes it difficult to
prevent others from access to the resources and
their ES, which might reduce the suitability of a
PES approach (Kemkes et al. 2010). Furthermore,
fisheries stakeholders tend to be numerous, dis-
persed and mobile; in a scheme where fishers are
the providers, although as a group they may have
a strong incentive to change their behaviour, as
individuals they each have an incentive to avoid
doing so (Pagiola 2008). This fragmentation could
also lead to multiple and conflicting claims for
payment and raise transaction costs – issues
encountered in forest conservation, where goods
and services are supplied by a variety of different
stakeholders at a range of geographic scales and
where land tenure is complex (Wunder 2007; To
et al. 2012). There can also be interdependence
between fisheries sectors: for example, shellfish
gleaners might be affected by fisheries practices,
but not necessarily included in a PES scheme.
The buyer in a PES scheme can be any actor
who benefits from service provision – fishers, an
NGO, a government body, a private company, con-
sumers or any combination of these. Interested
buyers may vary with the ES or action that is tar-
geted; a government might have an interest in
paying for an overall management plan, an NGO
for actions such as reduction in the use of damag-
ing gear, whereas a private company is more
likely to be interested in a specific ES such as fish
provision. Although no single source is likely to
be sufficient, the seafood sector is a potentially
significant and largely untapped source of invest-
ment for PES (Blasiak et al. 2014). It has already
shown willingness to support the transition to sus-
tainable fisheries through corporate social respon-
sibility programmes and involvement in fisheries
improvement projects (FIPs), certification schemes
and ecolabelling (Micheli et al. 2014). However,
research suggests that this willingness is not fully
exploited (Vallejo et al. 2009; Short 2011, 2012).
PES could be used to capture this willingness and
guide investment, thereby strengthening supply
chain accountability. For example, by providing
fishers with an economic incentive to avoid fishing
in nursery grounds, private companies may invest
in the natural capital of this habitat, that is, the
fish stocks and the flow of ES that support these
stocks. Through increased fishery profitability,
this mechanism may in turn stimulate additional
public or private investment.
Voluntary transaction
It is generally agreed that PES should at least be
voluntary for the provider in order for the pay-
ment to have conditionality, but that this is less
important for the buyer (Lau 2012; Tacconi
2012). For example, payments may be generated
through taxation, where the buyers themselves
may not necessarily be directly involved in the
transaction (Goldman-Benner et al. 2012). Others
propose that the extent to which the transaction is
voluntary depends on institutional context; for
instance, if payments are being used to alter
behaviours that are already illegal, in combination
with regulatory approaches, then the providers
may not act voluntarily (Sommerville et al. 2009;
Farley and Costanza 2010). Furthermore, in cases
where communities as a whole are acting as the
provider, as may often be the case in artisanal
fisheries, the transaction may be voluntary at
the level of the group rather than the individual
(Sommerville et al. 2009).
Conditionality
Conditionality is the conceptual core of PES, the
component that creates a consequence for not pro-
viding the ES (Sommerville et al. 2009). Payments
that are conditional on outcomes, that is, ES pro-
vision, are thought to be the most effective (Ferr-
aro and Kiss 2002; Banerjee et al. 2013), but in
practice, the technical and financial challenges of
monitoring mean that provider compliance with
the agreed management actions is often used
instead (Sommerville et al. 2009; Pattanayak et al.
2010). Due to the high levels of uncertainty
attached to most marine ES, conditionality on
their provision may be particularly difficult to
establish. Where the target is fish provision or
habitat protection, conditionality on, for example,
stock status or area protected may be relatively
easy to maintain, but proxy indicators are much
less available for regulating and cultural services
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than they are for provisioning ES (Liquete et al.
2013). Action-based payments still require
enforcement, however, and may therefore still lead
to high transaction costs in marine systems.
Additionality
Additionality is a measure of the outcome of an
intervention relative to the situation in its absence
and thus is an important indicator of the benefits
of PES as an approach (Sommerville et al. 2009;
Tacconi 2012). It is important to assess the cost-
effectiveness of a PES scheme, in relation to not
only the original situation but also the alternative
management approaches, if it is to be efficient.
Displacement should also be considered, where
payments allow ecosystem damage to be shifted
elsewhere resulting in no net change in fisheries
practice or ecosystem condition on a broader scale
(Wunder et al. 2008). However, additionality is
often difficult to establish and therefore rarely
explicitly monitored in PES schemes (Sommerville
et al. 2009). The estimation of baselines and coun-
terfactuals in the marine environment suffers from
similar challenges to those encountered in the
monitoring of ES provision, particularly in small-
scale developing world fisheries that often lack
even the most basic management tools such as
stock assessments. It may be more practical to
assess actions rather than outcomes in such cases,
and surveys assessing perceptions of compliance
and scheme acceptability could be used to monitor
and evaluate some components of PES impact over
time (Hallwass et al. 2013). Furthermore, social
diffusion, where the change in behaviour of a small
percentage of fishers may have positive impacts on
the behaviour of others, should also be taken into
account when assessing overall additionality of a
scheme (Goldman-Benner et al. 2012).
Scope for PES in ﬁsheries
A fisheries PES scheme may be used to support an
overall management plan, a specific management
action or the provision of a specific ES. It might,
for example, be a short-term measure to support
seafood provision, or the adoption of actions
known to increase seafood provision. However, the
principles of an ecosystem approach would ideally
require a broader focus, which encompasses addi-
tional ES. A scheme supporting a management
plan, conservation outcome or bundle of ES is
more likely to maintain additionality over alterna-
tive approaches and therefore may be more sus-
tainable in the long run.
There are examples in the peer-reviewed litera-
ture of mechanisms which compensate fishers for
earnings lost or costs incurred through a change
in gear type, fishing location or fishing practice
(D€oring and Egelkraut 2007; Vinha et al. 2010;
see Table 1). In particular, the feasibility of govern-
ment and tourist compensation payments to small-
scale artisanal fisheries has been investigated (Barr
and Mourato 2009; Begossi et al. 2011a), but
examples of actual implementation are rare. Fur-
thermore, the extent to which many of these
mechanisms conform to the defining principles of
PES is unclear; although they use positive incen-
tives, conditionality rarely appears to be in place.
For example, the Brazilian government operates a
payment scheme called the defeso, whereby fishers
receive compensation for costs incurred during
periods of fishery closure (Begossi et al. 2011a).
However, criticism of their systems of MCS indi-
cates that payments are not fully conditional on
compliance, nor is the transaction voluntary from
the perspective of the providers (Begossi et al.
2011a). According to Begossi et al. (2011a),
improvements in the scheme could allow it to serve
as the ‘basis for more effective PES instruments’.
The only example of a fisheries payment mech-
anism formally referred to as PES in the literature
to date is that of the Banc d’Arguin National
Park in Mauritania, where the European Union
(EU) allocates part of its payment for the
EU-Mauritania Fisheries Partnership Agreement
to the management of the Park (Binet et al.
2013). By investing in the biomass productivity
of the Park, the EU is protecting nursery and
breeding sites that contribute to the productivity
of its commercial fishing grounds. This mecha-
nism is the first international payment of its kind
and breaks down some of the theoretical barriers
to marine PES; it has led to enhanced manage-
ment of the Park, and there is potential for the
mechanism to be extended to benefit other major
fisheries in Mauritania and in Guinea Bissau
(Binet et al. 2013).
Seafood certification schemes are sometimes
described as a form of PES (e.g. Forest Trends &
The Katoomba Group 2010), although they fulfil
only some of the defining principles. The most
prevalent of these, the Marine Stewardship Council
(MSC), aims to create positive market incentives
© 2014 The Authors. Fish and Fisheries Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd., F I SH and F I SHERIES 5
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for sustainable fishing by shifting consumer
demand towards MSC-certified products, thereby
generating a return on investment in sustainable
practices. In theory, the certified fishery (voluntary
provider) receives a price premium from the con-
sumer (the buyer), which is conditional on the
effective management and health of the fishery
and its impact on the environment (Roheim et al.
2011; MSC 2013). However, although the MSC
has begun quantitatively to evaluate its perfor-
mance (MSC 2013), it has been criticized for weak
linkages between certification and conservation
outcomes (Ward 2008; Jacquet et al. 2010;
Christian et al. 2013; Micheli et al. 2014) and it
does not currently explicitly address defined ES
other than seafood production – certification of
bundles of marine ES may increase opportunities
for ecological and socioeconomic impacts. Fur-
thermore, the participation of developing world
fisheries in MSC certification is currently limited
by the costs of entering the scheme and monitor-
ing of compliance with standards (Micheli et al.
2014). There is already pressure on companies
throughout the seafood supply chain to source
MSC-certified products; PES initiatives have the
potential to complement and strengthen MSC cer-
Table 1 Summary of marine and coastal fishery payment mechanisms documented in the peer-reviewed literature. All
are based on positive incentives, but the extent of conditionality and additionality are unclear in all but the case of the
European Union-Mauritania fisheries agreement – the only example to be explicitly described as a PES.
Scheme Start Buyer Provider Payment Ecosystem service
Defeso: compensation
for ﬁsheries closure
during ﬁsh reproduction
(Begossi et al. 2011a).
1986 Brazilian
government
Artisanal ﬁshers,
Brazil
Financial
compensation
Fish production
Marine Stewardship
Council scheme
(Roheim et al. 2011)
1997 Consumer Certiﬁed ﬁshery Price premium Meeting MSC
standards
Sea turtle by-catch
release (Ferraro and
Gjertsen 2009)
1998 Watamu Turtle
Watch: Kenyan
NGO
Artisanal ﬁshers,
Kenya
Financial
performance
payments
Sea turtles
Sea turtle by-catch
release (Ferraro and
Gjertsen 2009)
2000 RENATURA:
Congolese NGO
Artisanal ﬁshers,
Congo
Materials to
ﬁx/replace net
Sea turtles
Biodiversity offsets or
by-catch mitigation
scheme (Janisse et al.
2010)
2004 FISH: an
association of
California drift
gillnet swordﬁshers
ASUPMATOMA:
Mexican NGO
Financial
payments
Sea turtles
Vaquita by-catch
reduction (Gjertsen and
Niesten 2010)
2007 Mexican
government
Artisanal ﬁshers,
Northern Gulf of
California
Gillnet permits
purchased or
leased from
ﬁshers
Vaquita population
Compensation for hilsa
conservation in
Bangladesh (Mohammed
and Wahab 2013)
2005 Government of
Bangladesh
Affected
Bangladeshi
communities
Compensation in
the form of rice
and alternative
livelihoods
Fish production
International payment
operating through a
bilateral ﬁsheries
agreement (Binet
et al. 2013)
2006 European Union Banc d’Arguin
National Park,
Mauritania
Funding for the
direct conservation
of marine and
coastal biodiversity
Biomass productivity,
including protection
of nursery and
breeding sites for
commercial species
‘Reverse ﬁshing licence’
programme for lost
commercial ﬁshing
revenue (Lau 2012)
2008 Multiple public
and private
bodies acting
through the
PIPA1 Trust
Government
of Kiribati
Financial
compensation
Protection of tuna
spawning areas,
seamounts and reefs
1Phoenix Islands Protected Area, Kiribati.
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tification schemes by channelling investment from
these companies to help cover some of the costs
to potential providers of participating in the
scheme (Short 2011, 2012).
Preconditions for PES in ﬁsheries
From the terrestrial and marine literature (e.g.
Wunder 2005; Sommerville et al. 2009; Lau
2012; Tacconi 2012), six key preconditions have
emerged, which are likely to enable the successful
delivery of a fisheries PES scheme as defined by
the principles mentioned earlier. Ideally, there
should be: (i) demand for one or more ES where
supply is threatened; (ii) suitable baseline data
available and a set of potential management
actions underpinned by robust science; (iii) clarity
and security of property rights; (iv) capacity for
hybrid multi-level governance; (v) capacity for
rigorous MCS; and (vi) potential for financial
sustainability of the scheme.
Demand for one or more ES where supply is
threatened
In order for a PES to deliver additional benefits,
there should be some level of current or future
threat to ES supply, be it overfishing or a more
indirect threat. Terrestrial experience indicates
that PES is most feasible when this threat is inter-
mediate or robustly predicted (Wunder 2005).
Finding buyers is likely to be more difficult in low-
threat scenarios where conservation benefits are
unlikely to be additional, but in very high-threat
scenarios, the opportunity costs of ES provision to
providers tend to be very high – for example,
when fishers depend on a rapidly declining
resource for their food security.
The more demand there is for the service(s) in
question, the easier it will be to identify buyers
and the greater the payment is likely to be. For
example, sea turtle conservation and carbon
sequestration would probably generate greater
demand than demersal invertebrate biodiversity or
the biological regulation provided by coral reef
shark populations. Although economic valuation
is by no means a prerequisite for PES, it can, in
addition to giving an indication of scheme viability
and appropriate design, help to promote this
demand (Emerton 2013; Wunder 2013). Because
of the existing market for seafood, there is likely to
be sufficient demand for seafood provision, particu-
larly if the species are commercially valuable; it
may be more difficult to convince potential buyers
of the benefits provided by other non-market ser-
vices impacted by fisheries. An investigation into
the dependence of seafood companies on ES, using
standardized metrics and indicators (Houdet et al.
2012), and advances in valuation methods for
non-market services (Barbier et al. 2011), may
help to generate demand by demonstrating the
interrelatedness of seafood supply and wider ES.
Moreover, bundling closely coupled services that
are in high demand and have established PES
markets (e.g. carbon sequestration) with seafood
production may attract buyers from outside the
seafood sector.
Availability of suitable baseline data and robust
science
For good design, implementation and monitoring,
PES requires a clear understanding of the social-
ecological system, and therefore the availability of
baseline data on the ES in question, system dynam-
ics and current/previous management approaches
(Wunder 2005). Although marine ES data are often
lacking (Guerry et al. 2011), novel approaches are
now emerging for their rigorous assessment, quan-
tification and mapping, particularly for commercial
fisheries but also for non-market services (Chan and
Ruckelshaus 2010; Tallis et al. 2012; Liquete et al.
2013; Blasiak et al. 2014). In the developing world,
however, fisheries are rarely well characterized, and
new approaches to stock assessment, ecosystem
modelling and the incorporation of uncertainty will
be required (Costello et al. 2012). For instance, low
capacity for data collection might be addressed
through the application of existing mobile phone
technology; mobile application surveys are being
trialled in the Solomon Islands with a view to
improving the management decisions of its inshore
fisheries (K. Rhodes, T. Welch, R. Pomeroy, M.
Knight, S. Diffey and K. Simeon, unpublished data).
In many developing countries, even the poorest of
fishers have access to mobile phones, and fishers
could be compensated for using their phones to par-
ticipate in data collection. When low-quality or few
data are available, models of intermediate complex-
ity for ecosystem (MICE) assessments can be used to
support fisheries decision-making in an ecosystem
context, while accounting for a broad range of
uncertainties (Plaganyi et al. 2012). They take into
account ecosystem objectives, but include only the
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components essential to answering the manage-
ment question at hand. Furthermore, PES may facil-
itate investment in building capacity for data
collection and identification of the minimal data
requirements. Alternatively, ecological data and
model frameworks from well-understood fisheries
can be transferred and applied to data-deficient situ-
ations.
A clear and preferably causal link should also
be established between the management action
which is being paid for and service delivery, allow-
ing for strong conditionality on outcomes (Binet
et al. 2013). Causal relationships are dynamic and
difficult to establish in marine systems (Guerry
et al. 2011). Furthermore, the fluidity of the mar-
ine environment means that resources can travel
quickly between management areas – particularly
in the case of migratory species and those with a
long-distance larval dispersal phase – making it
difficult to directly link conservation outcomes
with activities undertaken by the provider. Never-
theless, as discussed in detail by Lau (2012), the
types of management activities that lead to
enhanced service delivery are well understood in
fisheries (e.g. no-take zones, seasonal closures, by-
catch reduction devices) – although causal links
may not always be established specifically for the
system in question.
Clarity and security of property rights
Rights-based management systems such as individ-
ual transferable quotas (ITQs) and territorial use
rights (TURFs) can empower fishers to use
resources more sustainably and help to build insti-
tutional capacity that could benefit PES schemes,
if these management systems act at the same scale
as the PES (Costello et al. 2008; Kemkes et al.
2010). TURFs are likely to be more appropriate
than ITQs in developing world coastal fisheries
(Costello et al. 2012). However, in small-scale and
artisanal fisheries, where recognition and enforce-
ment of rights often fails, PES has the potential to
facilitate the process of rights clarification, which
can in turn act as a precursor to other forms of
management (Clements et al. 2010; Van Noo-
rdwijk et al. 2012). For example, Janssen et al.
(2013) have proposed that PES might be used to
address rights allocation issues and achieve both
fishery sustainability and protection of traditional
fishing communities in South Africa, by compen-
sating artisanal fishers for limiting their catch with
revenues from commercial fishery licence fees.
Success would depend, however, on the interde-
pendencies of those two fisheries and the sustain-
ability of the commercial fishery. PES schemes
might also be established under open-access or
common property regimes, as they have been in
terrestrial systems, by providing incentives for col-
lective action (Clements et al. 2010; Muradian
2013; Muradian et al. 2013). Moreover, in Lower
Amazon floodplain fisheries, the creation of co-
management fishing agreements (FAs) has defined
some access rules and established a legal institu-
tional framework, a process that could in theory
be applied to provide an institutional basis for PES
in other coastal fisheries (Hallwass et al. 2013). In
the high seas, which are essentially devoid of
rights, PES is not currently thought to be feasible
(Lau 2012). However, the concept of ‘side pay-
ments’ is being explored for internationally shared
tuna stocks (Bailey 2013), and with the right
cooperative institutional arrangements and indus-
try-wide agreements, a high-seas PES scheme
might help address current weaknesses in high-
seas governance (Aqorau 2007; Blasiak et al.
2014; Visbeck et al. 2014).
Capacity for hybrid multi-level governance
A PES mechanism requires a good governance
structure if it is to provide the accountability mech-
anisms to facilitate payments to the correct provid-
ers, increase transparency and reduce transaction
costs (Vatn 2010; Wunder 2013). Due to the
highly mobile and dispersed nature of most marine
resources and stakeholders, hierarchical (e.g. state)
and market governance structures will rarely be
suitable in marine PES schemes. Instead, Muradian
(2013), Muradian et al. (2013) argues that hybrid
forms of governance such as collective manage-
ment, which sit between markets and hierarchies,
are most efficient, although this will depend on the
institutional context (Ingram et al. 2014).
Although PES is often viewed as an alternative
to the failure or lack of conventional regulatory
measures, government regulation can be comple-
mentary and synergistic (Habtezion 2013) and is
likely to be very important in a fisheries context.
First, the variability of fish markets and subse-
quent variability of opportunity costs mean that in
some circumstances a fisheries PES scheme would
probably fail without regulation (Barr and Moura-
to 2009; Van Noordwijk et al. 2012). Second, if
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fishing rights are ambiguous, governments may
need to assist with their clarification and enforce-
ment. As such, the willingness and support of the
government in the state(s) where the fishing takes
place is necessary (Binet et al. 2013). Where state
governance is poor, however, collective institu-
tions and systems of community governance could
increase the opportunity for and durability of a
PES scheme (Clements et al. 2010; Begossi et al.
2012; Ingram et al. 2014). These institutions may
in turn benefit from the introduction of PES, if col-
lective payments included, for instance, funding of
training to improve internal collaboration (Hallw-
ass et al. 2013). The pre-existence of certain
locally developed institutions like co-management
schemes may thus prove an advantage for PES
(Kemkes et al. 2010; Vatn 2010; Ingram et al.
2014). However, the formation of new multi-level
institutions may also be necessary to drive coordi-
nation between relevant stakeholders at multiple
scales (Van Noordwijk et al. 2012; Habtezion
2013). At a regional or national scale, this might
entail the integration of community-level organiza-
tions, government agencies and NGOs. On an
international scale, a PES might be integrated into
pre-existing multilateral environmental agree-
ments such as the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), which would benefit from
increased international coordination (Habtezion
2013; Visbeck et al. 2014). Lessons in multi-scale
PES governance can be drawn from Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degrada-
tion (REDD+; Van Noordwijk et al. 2012).
Capacity for MCS
With good governance, there should come rigor-
ous systems of MCS. Whether a PES scheme is
outcome- or action based, the technical and finan-
cial challenges of MCS are heightened in the mar-
ine environment (Lau 2012). The requirement of
conditionality under PES may raise transaction
costs compared to other management approaches.
However, MCS is vital for sustainable fisheries
management, regardless of whether PES is in
place, and many management agencies already
have the equipment and resources required. In
low-income developing countries where this is not
the case, there are alternatives that would reduce
transaction costs. For example, if a scheme were
established under the common property rights of
a fishing community, conditionality might be
achieved through social norms that emerge from
collective action (Sommerville et al. 2009), or
through active community-level enforcement
(Begossi et al. 2012).
If payments are conditional, they should there-
fore incentivize investment in MCS so that provid-
ers qualify for these payments. Furthermore, PES
could be designed explicitly to alleviate or cover
the costs of MCS. For example, collective providers
of PES could use their payments to cover the cost
of boats and fuel or for the training or participation
of community members (Hallwass et al. 2013). It
has been proposed that coastal artisanal fishers
participating in compensatory mechanisms could
use their local knowledge to monitor fishing sites
used by industrial fishers, in order to reduce the
catch of juveniles and supplement landings data
(Begossi et al. 2011b). On an international scale,
through the EU-Mauritania Fisheries Agreement
and PES scheme, the EU is investing in MCS of the
Banc d’Arguin National Park (Binet et al. 2013).
Potential for financial sustainability
To ensure the continuity of a PES scheme, there
must be a mechanism in place for financial sus-
tainability – whether this is established through a
tool that generates a constant flow of finances, for
example in the form of user fees or taxes on fishing
licence fees, or through one that generates revenue
from investments in ES provision. It is likely that
any investment in an ES related to seafood provi-
sion will increase fishery profitability, whether this
is a result of stock recovery or the ability to set a
price premium on an end product. However, this
may not be the case if, for instance, the action
being paid for is one that may not affect fishery
profits (e.g. by-catch reduction). Experience from
watershed PES schemes indicates that the develop-
ment of a trust fund can enhance long-term PES
benefits, in such cases (Goldman-Benner et al.
2012). A trust fund, where payments are made
using the revenue from investment or a portion of
principal funds, can act as an intermediary
between buyers and providers and thus enable the
use of tools such as endowments and revolving
funds to create a sustainable source of financing
for PES (Bladon et al. 2014). Furthermore, the
model provides flexibility, independence from
political instabilities and a medium to draw
together diverse stakeholders (RedLAC 2010).
Although the majority of experience comes from
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terrestrial conservation, trust funds are being used
to generate and allocate funds in Marine Conserva-
tion Agreements, MPA management plans and
some marine PES schemes. For example, the Phoe-
nix Islands Protected Area Trust finances a conser-
vation contract with the Government of Kiribati,
and the creation of a trust fund for Mauritania’s
marine PES scheme has played a role in attracting
investment (Binet et al. 2013).
An exploration of the applicability of PES in
real-world circumstances
To assess whether PES could actually satisfy its
defining principles and successfully be imple-
mented in a real developing world fisheries man-
agement situation, we explore the presence or
absence of the above-mentioned preconditions in
four contrasting case-studies (Table 2). In each
case, the potential configurations and contribu-
tions of PES are discussed and the suitability of
and barriers to such an approach are analysed,
thereby highlighting the strengths and weaknesses
of PES under a broad range of institutional and
ecological circumstances. The case-studies are: (i)
a relatively simple and well-managed domestic
whitefish fishery; (ii) a complex multi-sector
domestic shrimp fishery; (iii) a lucrative interna-
tional fishery targeting a highly migratory species;
and (iv) a multi-sector and poorly understood
domestic fishery targeting an anadromous fish.
Namibian hake fishery
This industrial demersal trawl and longline fish-
ery, targeting cape hake (Merlucius capenis) and
Table 2 Potential structure of PES mechanisms in three contrasting fisheries and a summary of the extent to which
they fulfil the design preconditions for marine PES. A tick indicates complete fulfilment of a precondition; a tick and
cross indicates partial fulfilment; a cross indicates failure.
Namibian hake ﬁshery
Mozambican shallow-
water shrimp ﬁshery PNA skipjack tuna ﬁshery Bangladesh hilsa ﬁshery
Potential PES conﬁguration
ES/management
action
Hake production/
by-catch reduction
Mangrove or seagrass
habitat/shrimp
production
Skipjack production/
reduction in juvenile
and non-tuna
by-catch
Fish production (hilsa
and other food
products)/range of
regulatory and
supporting services of
coastal habitat.
Buyers International seafood
companies; European
retailers; governments
of Namibia, South
Africa and Angola;
international
consumers
International seafood
companies; European
retailers; commercial
ﬁshing companies;
international
consumers; tourism,
oil and gas industries
PNA, tuna retailers;
Paciﬁcal; seafood
companies; international
consumers; longline
ﬂeets
Commercial marine
ﬁshers; governments
of Bangladesh, India
and Myanmar;
international consumers;
national and international
companies
Providers Namibian and South
African hake ﬂeets
Artisanal ﬁshing
communities in
Mozambique
PNA skipjack ﬂeet. Artisanal river ﬁshing
communities in
Bangladesh
Design preconditions
Demand for and
threat to ES
U✗ U U U
Baseline data and
science
U✗ ✗ U ✗
Property rights U U✗ U ✗
Capacity for
governance
U ✗ U✗ U✗
Monitoring and
enforcement
U U✗ U ✗
Financial
sustainability
U✗ U✗ U U✗
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deep-water hake (Merlucius paradoxus), is the
country’s most valuable fishery and almost
entirely exported (OECD 2012). Although it is
widely thought to be relatively well managed,
stocks appear to be in decline and issues of social
equity have been highlighted (Paterson et al.
2013). A PES scheme might improve management
by realigning social, ecological and economic
goals.
Demand for one or more ES where supply is
threatened
There is evidence of a decline in hake stocks
in Namibia (BCC 2011) and global demand is
high, so a short-term transitional and interna-
tional PES scheme may be appropriate. This could
be expanded to pay for, for instance, by-catch
reduction, but whitefish fisheries tend to deliver
relatively few other ES and opportunities for
bundling may therefore be limited. In turn, this
reduces the potential for PES to produce addi-
tional ecosystem benefits over conventional man-
agement approaches in the long term.
Availability of suitable baseline data and robust
science
After decades of over-exploitation, Namibia has
rebuilt its hake fishery through access limitation
and a reduction in effort, so the impacts of these
actions are well established. Reliable stock assess-
ments, strong ecosystem understanding and mod-
elling approaches are available, which could be
used to support conditionality on ecosystem out-
comes (Roux and Shannon 2010; Kirchner et al.
2012). However, more detailed and reliable social
data might be required to ensure the equitable
distribution of benefits (Paterson et al. 2013).
Clarity and security of property rights
Namibia has developed a clear rights-based legal
framework and distributed individual non-transfer-
able quotas (Armstrong et al. 2004). This policy
aims to ensure that social benefits are returned to
citizens, but has been criticized for favouring the
elite minority over local development (Paterson
et al. 2013) – an issue that any PES scheme
should address. Nevertheless, the pre-existence of
clear and secure access rights would make the
identification of buyers and providers relatively
simple, considering that the marine fisheries sector
is exclusively industrial and conflict with other
users is unlikely.
Capacity for hybrid multi-level governance
A PES approach would fit within the perspective of
current fisheries management. Despite being a
developing country with limited financial
resources, Namibia has made a formal commit-
ment to ecosystem-based fisheries management
(Roux and Shannon 2010; MFMR 2012) and the
government has already shown interest in a par-
ticipatory and incentive-based approach and in
maximizing the value returned to Namibians – the
allocation of fishing rights was itself driven by tax
reductions connected to quota fees. Although they
hardly enter international waters, both species of
hake are managed together as a single stock,
which is shared with South Africa and Angola, so
a PES scheme would require international cooper-
ative governance – a prospect that is currently
being put into action through the Benguela Cur-
rent Convention and Commission (MFMR 2012).
Capacity for MCS
With the majority of fishing rights owned by Nam-
ibians, users are proximate and not too high in
number, and there is a good MCS system already
in place (Bergh and Davies 2004; OECD 2012).
This should reduce transaction costs and allow
benefits to be directly linked back to the activity
that is being paid for.
Potential for financial sustainability
Buyers could be promised a return on investment
through increased fishery profitability. Further-
more, the Namibian government currently collects
catch levies for a ‘fisheries fund’, which is used to
finance fisheries research (OECD 2012), although
it is unclear whether it would have the institu-
tional capacity to administer a PES.
Verdict
The hake fishery satisfies most of the precondi-
tions; it has clear and secure property rights, the
beginnings of a hybrid multi-level governance sys-
tem, good MCS and a potential mechanism for
financial sustainability. Nevertheless, there may be
limited opportunities for long-term additionality of
a PES scheme.
Mozambican shallow-water shrimp fishery
Mozambique’s shallow-water shrimp fishery
(Indian white prawn Fenneropenaeus indicus and
speckled shrimp Metapenaeus monoceros) is a
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commercially important and multi-sector fishery
(Palha Sousa et al. 2011). It fulfils some of the
preconditions for a PES scheme, which has the
potential to address the need for a holistic man-
agement approach, but there are a number of
social and ecological uncertainties that may limit
implementation.
Demand for one or more ES where supply is
threatened
Although the fishery is considered to be relatively
sustainable, there are over-capacity, conflict
between the artisanal and commercial sectors, and
high levels of non-shrimp by-catch and discarding
(Banks and MacFadyen 2011). For example, con-
tinued expansion of the artisanal sector, which
experiences juvenile overfishing, could have seri-
ous economic implications for the semi-industrial
sector (Palha Sousa et al. 2011). If a PES scheme
were to operate through payments from down-
stream supply chain companies to artisanal fishers
– for instance, as compensation for avoiding nurs-
ery grounds in a marine reserve – between-sector
conflict may be reduced. Economically, the shrimp
fisheries are the most important in Mozambique,
and the artisanal sector is the most important
source of food and employment for coastal com-
munities (Banks and MacFadyen 2011). Local and
foreign demand for shrimp production from pro-
ducers, retailers and consumers is therefore high,
and buyers may be convinced of the importance of
mangrove and seagrass habitats in this produc-
tion. The potential for mangrove-based PES sys-
tems is well recognized (Locatelli et al. 2014), and
if services were bundled, it may also be possible to
attract investment from other industries such as
tourism or oil and gas, and via the global carbon
market.
Availability of suitable baseline data and robust
science
This ecosystem is not well understood, and fishery
success in any 1 year is likely to be strongly
affected by variation in freshwater flow from the
Zambezi River and its effect on recruitment (Gam-
melsrod 1992), making a direct link between a
particular management activity and ecological
outcomes difficult to establish. Artisanal catches
are not yet incorporated into annual stock assess-
ments, although they are estimated to form a sub-
stantial proportion of total shrimp catch, and data
on the number of artisanal vessels in operation
are highly inconsistent (Banks and MacFadyen
2011). The resulting uncertainty in catch data is
one of the main reasons why a pre-assessment for
MSC certification found the fishery to be unsuit-
able in its recent state (Moody Marine Ltd. 2008).
However, the requirement for conditionality in
PES may incentivize investment in innovative new
methods of artisanal data collection. It may also
be possible to use models developed for other fish-
eries as a framework for the Mozambican shrimp;
there has been extensive work conducted on the
well-managed and well-understood multi-species
Australian northern prawn fishery, which incorpo-
rates the issue of uncertainty (Dichmont et al.
2006a,b,c).
Clarity and security of property rights
The fishery is constrained within Mozambique’s
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and commercial
access is restricted to licence holders. Furthermore,
government is moving towards a rights-based
approach, which would make the system more
amenable to PES (Tindall 2012). However, there is
a great deal of interaction between the shallow-
and deep-water fisheries in the region, and a PES
scheme should perhaps therefore not be con-
strained to the shallow-water fishery. The arti-
sanal sector is essentially open access and
supports several thousand fishers along the
coastline (Banks and MacFadyen 2011), so the
identification of providers would be complex. Nev-
ertheless, local co-management committees operat-
ing licensing systems have now been established
in most fishing communities, with some success,
which might provide an institutional basis for PES
(MRAG 2010).
Capacity for hybrid multi-level governance
Through a comprehensive management plan, the
government is beginning to address management
concerns, but it still lacks implementation capac-
ity. Furthermore, the interactions between the
shallow- and deep-water fisheries in the region,
and between the commercial and artisanal sectors
of the shallow-water fishery, are not currently
reflected in their governance. A PES scheme would
require the development of institutional capacity
through the coordination and integration of man-
agement authorities in different sectors, in different
regions and at different levels, and with corpora-
tions and co-management organizations (Banks
and MacFadyen 2011).
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Capacity for MCS
For a basic level of conditionality to be achieved,
the current system of MCS would need improve-
ment (Banks and MacFadyen 2011). Illegal, unre-
ported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is a problem
in Mozambique (MRAG 2005), the industrial ves-
sel monitoring system (VMS) is not fully opera-
tional (Banks and MacFadyen 2011), and the
artisanal fishery is largely unregulated; artisanal
fishers are not included in the seasonal closures
imposed on commercial sectors, and they operate
close to shore, often in estuarine mangrove nurs-
ery areas, and increasingly using illegal mosquito
nets (M. Rodrigues, personal communication). Low
levels of national educational capacity and access
to technology in Mozambique may mean that con-
siderable investment in capacity building would be
required to achieve the necessary improvements in
top-down research, administration and enforce-
ment (FAO 2007). A system of co-management
may be preferable (Bene et al. 2010), and it may
be possible for a PES scheme to be designed so as
to include mechanisms for and alleviate the social
costs of community monitoring and enforcement
(Begossi et al. 2011b).
Potential for financial sustainability
Buyers could be promised a return on investment
through increased fishery profitability, and there
may be opportunities for mechanisms that gener-
ate a constant flow of revenue through user fees.
Verdict
Application of PES to the shrimp fishery in its cur-
rent state may in theory be limited by poor ecosys-
tem understanding and a lack of institutional
capacity for integrated governance, MCS and
financial sustainability. But through investment in
capacity building and identification of the gaps in
understanding, PES may provide a mechanism to
address these deficiencies.
PNA Western and Central Pacific purse seine
skipjack tuna fishery
The application of PES to tuna fisheries would be
ideal in terms of their lucrative markets, but also
particularly challenging in terms of the highly
migratory nature of tuna. The Parties to the
Nauru Agreement (PNA) is a subregional alliance
between eight adjacent Pacific Island states for
the management of a purse seine skipjack tuna
(Katsuwonus pelamis) fishery. Although the institu-
tional and political complexities of the Western
and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) tuna fisheries
might preclude them from suitability for PES on
first assessment, the PNA has created an environ-
ment in which PES could be feasible.
Demand for one or more ES where supply is
threatened
Tuna has high economic value (Collete et al.
2011), and demand is therefore great from con-
sumers, international retailers, producers and the
economies of dependent Pacific states. PNA skip-
jack is considered to be sustainably managed, and
the free-school skipjack fishery has gained MSC
certification (Moody Marine Ltd. 2011). However,
those fleets that still target skipjack near fish
aggregating devices (FADs) catch undersize tuna
and contribute to the overfishing of other species
such as bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus) (Bailey
2013). A PES targeting skipjack production and/
or by-catch reduction might generate additional
benefits over those delivered by current PNA man-
agement. Payments to PNA skipjack fleets chan-
nelled from various potential sources, including
longline fleets that target bigeye, could incentivize
free-school purse seining.
Availability of suitable baseline data and robust
science
Good stock assessments and data on skipjack
and bigeye movements are available, and rela-
tively advanced spatial ecosystem and population
dynamics models can also be used for the investi-
gation of tuna management scenarios and inter-
species interactions in the Pacific (Lehodey et al.
2008).
Clarity and security of property rights
WCPO tuna fisheries fall under the jurisdictions of
multiple states that hold property rights within
their EEZs, and fishing operations range from
coastal artisanal fleets to industrial purse seine
and longline fleets on the high seas (Aqorau
2007). The variable movements of tuna therefore
complicate the identification of buyers and provid-
ers and may create a free-rider problem; one buyer
might end up paying for conservation measures
while a distant actor reaps the benefits (Bailey
2013). However, the PNA states have asserted
their property rights to control 70% of WCPO and
50% of global skipjack tuna catch and established
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high-seas closures in the areas between their EEZs
(Maurice Brownjohn, Commercial Director of
PNA, personal communication). The PNA also
operates a vessel day scheme (VDS) for purse sein-
ers, a rights-based transferable effort scheme
where PNA members are allocated fishing days
which they can trade between themselves and
allocate to distant water fleets at their discretion
(Aqorau 2009; Havice 2013). The strengthening
of rights that this entails would make it possible to
clearly identify providers in a PES regime.
Capacity for hybrid multi-level governance
PNA was established following mutual concerns of
the participating states over sustainability and eco-
nomic opportunity, and there has since been a
paradigm shift in the way they view and manage
their resources. In addition to political will from
individual states, the PNA forms an institutional
basis for the implementation of a PES scheme,
although the complexity of creating such a
large-scale and international PES should not be
underestimated. PNA resources are not con-
strained solely within the PNA states and fall
under the jurisdictions of multiple overlapping
regional management and advisory bodies, includ-
ing the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Com-
mission (WCPFC), Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries
Agency (FFA), PNA and TVM (Te Vaka Moana). A
multi-level governance framework for the integra-
tion of each of these bodies would be desirable,
but mutual economic and ecological objectives
would first need to be identified.
Capacity for MCS
PNA terms of licence enforce strict management
rules with 100% observer coverage (M. Brown-
john, personal communication), and the VDS pro-
vides a mandatory real-time vessel monitoring
system (Havice 2013), which might allow pay-
ments to be conditional on actions or outcomes.
Enforcement is difficult on the high seas, but PNA
has also established high-seas closures in areas
between EEZs, reducing IUU and therefore the risk
of free-riding.
Potential for financial sustainability
PNA management is currently funded through
fixed conservation levies from fishing vessels, and
although these levies are not currently conditional
on meeting any specific ecosystem objectives or
MSC standards, this could provide the basis for a
sustainable PES. Furthermore, there is already
strong supply chain and market interest in the
sustainability of the fishery; through the market
access enabled by its joint venture with import
and branding agency Pacifical, the PNA generates
a 20% premium on free-school skipjack products
via MSC certification and labelling, the majority of
which is channelled back to industry. Its co-brand-
ing programme with Pacifical also allows trace-
ability of a can of tuna back to the vessels and
factory involved in its production (Tindall 2012) –
a system that has created an unprecedented level
of transparency within the supply chain and that
could allow corporate responsibility to be appor-
tioned accordingly (Short 2012).
Verdict
This case-study fully satisfies five of six precondi-
tions. The only theoretical barrier to PES is the
complexity of WCPO tuna governance; increased
levels of coordination between PNA and other gov-
ernance bodies may not be a realistic expectation.
Bangladesh hilsa fishery
Hilsa (Tenualosa ilisha) is anadromous, the majority
of the population migrating from marine to fresh
water for spawning, and as such supports riverine
and marine fisheries in Bangladesh (Blaber et al.
2003a; Amin et al. 2008). There is currently a
compensation scheme in place to encourage sus-
tainable fishing practices in Bangladesh, which
appears to have had a positive impact on hilsa
production, but there are questions surrounding
sustainability, equity and efficiency of the scheme,
which might be addressed through a more formal-
ized PES approach (Mohammed and Wahab
2013).
Demand for one or more ES where supply is
threatened
The hilsa fishery is the largest and most valuable
single-species fishery in Bangladesh, but there has
been a decline in stocks in recent years (Mome
et al. 2007). As a fish with historical significance
in Bengali culture, there is strong local and inter-
national demand for hilsa, mainly amongst the
Bengali diaspora. Not only is it essential for
the food security of Bangladesh, particularly the
coastal poor, but also it provides direct livelihoods
for over 280 000 fishermen and an additional 2–
2.5 million workers involved in the supply chain
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(Mohammed and Wahab 2013). Although there
may be less demand for hilsa from international
companies than for seafood which is more popular
in the west, the national government has already
demonstrated a strong willingness to invest in the
fishery through its current management approach,
whereby affected river fishers are compensated for
loss of earnings during fishing bans (Mohammed
and Wahab 2013). The bundling of other ES into
a PES scheme would increase investment opportu-
nity outside of the seafood sector; for example,
small-meshed gillnets used to catch hilsa are asso-
ciated with aquatic biodiversity issues in the river-
ine fishery (BOBLME 2012), and the coastal
habitats protected within the hilsa sanctuaries pro-
vide regulating and supporting services, including
those that contribute to the resilience of fisheries
and coastal communities to climate change (Alli-
son et al. 2009). There is great potential for pay-
ments for hilsa conservation to be integrated with
other social and environmental protection
schemes.
Availability of suitable baseline data and robust
science
Hilsa is poorly understood, stock assessments are
highly uncertain, and there are little baseline
social, economic or ecological data available, par-
ticularly for the riverine fishery (Mome et al.
2007; Amin et al. 2008; BOBLME 2010). Stock
decline has prompted the government to designate
sanctuaries in major riverine hilsa spawning and
nursery grounds where seasonal fishing bans are
implemented (BOBLME 2010). However, the
degree to which the sanctuaries actually contrib-
ute to hilsa conservation and the scientific basis
for their location need critical evaluation. Hilsa is
threatened not only by overfishing but by pollu-
tion, upstream damming and climate change
(Blaber et al. 2003b; BOBLME 2010); it is possible
that due to the impacts of climate change on hilsa
migration, some of these sanctuaries are no longer
important spawning grounds, and there are
inshore marine areas of potential importance that
currently receive no protection (Blaber et al.
2003a). Furthermore, payments would probably
have to be conditional on actions rather than out-
comes, and although ecological additionality may
be impossible to measure directly, any scheme
would need to be adaptive to keep pace with the
rapid environmental changes that are affecting the
hilsa fishery.
Clarity and security of property rights
The process of buyer/provider identification would
be complex due to the migratory nature of hilsa
and the open-access nature of the fishery; there is
a lack of recognition of traditional property rights,
and most vessels are unregistered (Amin et al.
2008; BOBLME 2010). Identification cards are
being issued to help authorities distinguish genu-
ine fishers from those claiming to be, but hilsa
stocks in the Bay of Bengal are also commercially
exploited by Myanmar and India (BOBLME 2010).
Not only would these countries benefit from mea-
sures implemented by Bangladesh, but also their
river fishery management will affect stocks in Ban-
gladesh; the prospect of transboundary manage-
ment is being discussed through the Bay of Bengal
Large Marine Ecosystem Project (BOBLME 2012),
and a cooperative transnational PES system would
be therefore be desirable, although perhaps not
politically feasible.
Capacity for hybrid multi-level governance
Current management indicates that there is political
will and capacity for the governance of a national
PES scheme; national government has taken up
management recommendations made by a number
of external projects (BOBLME 2010) and funds the
current compensation scheme itself (Mohammed
and Wahab 2013). Building on lessons from Brazil’s
defeso system (Begossi et al. 2011a,b), these funds
might be channelled down to the local level through
fisher associations. Linkages between the various
agencies involved in hilsa management are, how-
ever, weak (BOBLME 2012), and greater levels of
cooperation would be required. Risk posed by poten-
tial government instability should also be consid-
ered, and this risk might be mitigated by taking
measures to reduce financial dependence on gov-
ernment (Bladon et al. 2014). Ideally, a multi-level
institution would be established between Bangla-
desh, India and Myanmar, integrating the relevant
national and local governments and agencies, NGOs
and community-level organizations.
Capacity for MCS
Compliance with conservation measures in the
hilsa fishery is low (Siddique 2009; BOBLME
2010), and MCS is poor. Although conditionality
may therefore be difficult to achieve, the imple-
mentation of PES could help to build capacity.
The scheme might be designed to involve local
communities and fisher associations in monitoring
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and enforcement, collective payments might be
used to invest in mobile phone technologies to
provide more reliable data from the artisanal fish-
ery, or compliance might be monitored indirectly
through surveys of fisher perceptions over time
(Hallwass et al. 2013).
Potential for financial sustainability
Although compensation currently comes directly
from national government budget allocation, the
possibility of establishing a national trust fund for
hilsa conservation is being explored, which could
be capitalized with new sources of funds such as
earmarked hilsa export taxes (Mohammed and
Wahab 2013).
Verdict
The hilsa fishery appears to be the least amenable
case-study, satisfying only one of the six precondi-
tions fully. However, in these less-than-perfect cir-
cumstances, PES might be used to leverage the
changes required; the recent political support for
hilsa stock rebuilding indicates great potential for
a national PES scheme to facilitate investment in
capacity building for community-based monitoring
and enforcement and the development of a more
cooperative and integrated system of governance.
Conclusions
There are challenges to the design and implemen-
tation of PES in marine environments, but too
much focus on theory may obscure opportunities
for less-than-perfect PES schemes to benefit fisher-
ies management and stakeholders. PES is not a
silver bullet, but when used together with conven-
tional regulatory approaches, it could play a sig-
nificant role in incentivizing sustainable fishing
practices in developing countries. Furthermore,
through systematic private sector engagement,
PES could facilitate increased investment in fisher-
ies improvement by buyers of ES, thereby reducing
the burden of costs and responsibility placed on
governments and fishers themselves.
First and foremost, payments should be condi-
tional on actions, if not on conservation out-
comes, but these actions still need a robust
scientific basis. Six key preconditions have been
identified, which would, in theory, enable the suc-
cessful delivery of a fisheries PES scheme. It is rare
that a developing country fishery will fulfil each of
these preconditions a priori, but that is not to say
a PES approach would be inappropriate in such
circumstances, as long as there is capacity for
improvement. In practice, design will depend on
the precise institutional context and may require
creative and innovative approaches to the mainte-
nance of conditionality and additionality. For
example, the Bangladesh hilsa fishery satisfies few
PES preconditions, but the level of political will
already displayed for the rebuilding of stocks pre-
sents an opportunity for improvement through the
support of a PES. Although the hilsa fishery lacks
the history of rights-based and ecosystem-based
management demonstrated by the Namibian hake
and PNA tuna examples, it does have a compen-
sation scheme already in place, and any coher-
ence between existing institutions and those
required for PES increases the viability and sus-
tainability of such a scheme. For highly migratory
species such as tuna, the development of interna-
tional collaborative institutions such as the PNA
may play an important role in the feasibility of
PES; though, they must grow in scale if they are
to operate on the high seas. Where weak gover-
nance and institutions reduce the potential for
conditionality, as is often the case in developing
countries, PES may drive institutional reform; it
may, for instance, be used to facilitate rights clari-
fication, to pay for or incentivize improvements in
MCS, or to address the shortcomings of an exist-
ing co-management programme. More research at
the interface of PES and complementary institu-
tional structures such as trust funds, TURFs, ITQs
and co-management systems may advance the
appropriate application of PES in developing world
fisheries.
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